Affordable housing may be provided in a variety of ways, including housing subsidies, mobility programs, court-mandated set asides, inclusionary zoning,`smart growth' initiatives and affirmative marketing efforts by lenders. Key actors include federal, state, and local governments; public housing authorities; community development corporations; commercial developers; and faith-based organizations.
Despite the best efforts of diverse providers of affordable housing, there remain structural impediments to meeting the housing needs of poor and working families in the US (Millennial Housing Commission, 2002) . Many affluent communities, looking to maximize their fiscal well-being and quality of life, enforce land-use policies that limit access of lower-income families to affordable housing. Larger urban areas, seeking to stabilize their tax base, are forced to make difficult trade-offs between attracting and retaining affluent families and meeting the basic needs of lower-income families. Low-income and moderate-income families may lack access to information about housing opportunities, and may lack the financial resources to purchase desirable housing and legal remedies for housing discrimination. Many affordable housing providers are unable to measure the social benefits and costs of policy trade-offs associated with alternative provision strategies.
Many of these problems are a concern in other parts of the developed world. European countries recognize barriers to affordable housing, especially in capital regions, and share a number of common concerns. For example, market-based barriers include high ownership transfer fees and the lack of a secondary mortgage market; regulatory barriers include complex and time-consuming zoning processes and high levels of community opposition to affordable housing initiatives (Urban Land Institute, 2003) . In addition, direct government support for subsidized housing construction and operations have been stagnant or decreasing in Canada (Sousa and Quarter, 2003) and in the United Kingdom (Crook and Whitehead, 2002) as they have been in the USA. In addition, there are significant uncertainties in the UK regarding appropriate planning mechanisms to increase the supply of affordable housing (Crook and Whitehead, 2002) and in regard to integrating market-rate and subsidized housing in common developments (Tiesdell, 2004) .
In general, American housing policy has tended to emphasize improving the mix of incomes within assisted housing communities and enabling poor families to relocate to more advantaged neighborhoods using tenant-based housing subsidies. In contrast, European housing policy has generally focused more on`area-based initiatives' to improve the status of entire neighborhoods rather than the smaller areas in which assisted housing is concentrated (Musterd, 2002) . One example of this policy is`local housing plans' in the United Kingdom, which rely on a richer set of data, focus more on implementation and strategy, and take more seriously the task of competitive and realistic bidding for central government funding than their American analogues (Varady, 1996) . This paper recognizes that physical location of housing is a key means to the end goal of individual and community health. Therefore, a two-stage process based on facility-location modeling is used to design siting strategies for affordable housing that balance efficiency and equity concerns. Benefits to planners of such a strategy include a deeper understanding of the physical, economic, and social attributes of affordable housing, and the ability to choose among alternative Pareto-optimal configurations of affordable housing. It is argued that these benefits outweigh the cost of analytical requirements to formulate and solve these models.
This paper advances housing policy in a number of ways. First, it is policy relevant. The models developed are consistent with recommendations for increasing the supply of affordable housing made by the Millennial Housing Commission (2002), including capital subsidies for low-income families and strategic community development. Second, this work motivates research to estimate model components that are of interest in their own right, such as supply and demand and benefits and costs of affordable housing. Third, this work generalizes existing results in quantitative models for the provision of subsidized housing. Finally, the models in this paper are applied to a case study involving a real-world affordable housing provider.
Previous work
Though the existing literature on prescriptive planning models for affordable or subsidized housing provision is limited, the literature on closely related areas is quite extensive. Arnott (1987) provides a detailed survey of the characteristics of housing, such as necessity, durability, spatial fixity, and the presence of transaction costs that distinguish it from other goods. Clark and Van Lierop (1986) examine the housinglocation literature from two complementary perspectives: housing market choice and residential mobility. Another perspective on normative models for public facility location is given by Johansson and Leonardi (1986) . These authors define public facilities along two dimensions: the type of good provided and the means by which the good is made available to citizens.
The operations research (OR) literature on facility location is well defined in terms of models, solution methods, and applications (eg Daskin, 1995) , and in particular urban and public-sector facility location (ReVelle, 1987) . The models in this paper are inspired by two specific works in facility location and urban affairs. The first is a classic paper in urban planning by Herbert and Stevens (1960) presenting a linear programming model for allocation of housing about urban regions. The second is a recent doctoral thesis by Aboolian (2002) on the competitive facility-location and design problem for private-sector enterprises that inspires efforts to model the many different characteristics of housing.
Since regional authorities may provide policy guidance or prescriptions, as well as some financial support to local authorities who make specific housing provision decisions, the literature on multilevel planning is relevant to this paper. Athannassopolous (1995) uses goal programming and data envelopment analysis to identity strategies for allocating financial resources from a central government to local governments in the presence of competing goals. Wen and Hsu (1991) review the literature on a more stylized management problem: identifying optimal strategies for multiple administrative units, of varying levels of responsibility and influence, higher-placed ones influencing lower-placed ones but all optimizing their own actions. A specific example of this approach, called the bilevel programming problem, has been applied to problems in finance and government policy, among others. The most general presentation of the multilevel management problem is given by Johannson and Leonardi (1986) , who develop partial-equilibrium models that solve the multilevel facility location problem regionally and globally. These models use varying assumptions as to the nature of cooperation between the different levels and the management responsibility of the different levels.
I now address research results in OR specifically concerned with the provision of affordable or subsidized housing. Kaplan (1986) and Kaplan and Berman (1988) have developed models for family relocation during public housing renovations. Forgionne (1991) and Forgionne and Frager (1998) assisted the US Army in forecasting demand and allocating resources for military housing. Johnson and Hurter (2000) presented a multiobjective optimization model for housing mobility policy design. Extensions to the Johnson and Hurter work include a simplified model for provision of tenant-based subsidized housing (Johnson, 2003) , and a new model for project-based subsidized housing (Johnson, 2006a) ; both were applied to a larger, more realistic dataset than those used previously.
Previous research results on subsidized housing planning are limited in scope and applicability. Subsidized housing accounts for only 28.8% of all nonmilitary federal support for housing. Moreover, 89.1% of all direct federal support for housing is targeted at renters, whereas the number of renters and owners facing affordability challenges are nearly equal (Millennial Housing Commission, 2002, pages 15, 25) . Thus, there is a research opportunity to address the larger universe of renter-occupied as well as owner-occupied affordable housing. This paper represents an initial effort to achieve these goals.
Key results
This paper develops two groups of results. First, it produces a novel modeling framework for affordable housing planning. This framework enables planners to describe development initiatives according to various physical and programmatic characteristics of affordable housing. In addition, this paper provides theoretical support for two new models, the strategic (region-wide) and tactical (neighborhood-level) housing planning models, using results from multilevel planning.
Second, the paper provides a useful insight to practitioners. Using data from a case study in western Pennsylvania, I show that there are significant tradeoffs between efficiency (net social benefit) and equity (perceived`fair share' measures) that correspond to distinct development patterns over space and housing type. In addition, we identify candidate`compromise' solutions, whose objective function values represent significant improvements over least-desirable values associated with`corner' solutions that optimize one objective or another.
Outline
The format for the remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews disciplinary preliminaries to quantitative models for affordable housing planning. Section 3 presents aggregate resource-allocation and place-based facility-location models for affordable housing. Section 4 reviews the data necessary to calibrate these models. Section 5 is a case study of Allegheny County, PA. Section 6 discusses policy implications. Section 7 summarizes and identifies next steps.
Planning preliminaries

Disciplinary motivations
The work described in this paper, though prescriptive in nature, takes advantage of economics-based approaches to housing policy modeling by identifying restrictive assumptions used in previous subsidized housing-location models and by addressing more fully the variety of physical and programmatic attributes of affordable housing. This approach allows us to address a number of policy questions. These include: What levels of supply and demand of existing affordable housing might justify a public-sector intervention to increase the amount of good-quality affordable housing? How should an affordable housing provider allocate limited resources among various strategies to maximize some measure of net social benefit? Given available resources for specific housing strategies, where should housing be developed, and how many units of housing should be developed at specific sites, to optimize various outcome measures?
Partial-equilibrium mathematical programming-based approaches to facility location can provide useful analytical tools for housing planning, especially if the amount of housing to be located is small enough so as not to significantly affect local markets, and if we explicitly account for the multidimensional nature of housing.
Various housing initiatives provide support for and against the former concern. While the Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing (MTO) demonstration program resulted in a very small number of participant families relocating to any particular neighborhood (US Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2003) , the HOPE VI program by design redeveloped large-scale housing projects in well-delineated portions of distressed neighborhoods. In fact, the possibility of beneficial local housing market effects of this program served as one of its justifications (Popkin et al, 2004) . In this paper I assume that affordable housing providers seek to develop housing initiatives over a substantial service area and are limited by financial resources, the possibility of local political opposition, and technical expertise from developing individual projects at the scale of typical HOPE VI developments.
I address the latter concern by modeling economic characteristicsösuch as benefits and costs, and supply and demandöthat are functions of multiple attributes and which vary over space and time.
The key goal of the model is maximization of social welfare resulting from decisions made by affordable housing providers. This perspective is appropriate to the extent that demand for affordable housing outstrips supply, and the choice spaces of individual low-income consumers are constrained relative to more-affluent consumers. Both of these requirements are generally met in practice.
Affordable housing components
In previous papers (Johnson, 2003; 2006a) I have argued that subsidized housing differs from traditional facilities, such as warehouses, stores, and service facilities, in the type and magnitude of externalities associated with relevant policy initiatives. For example, occupants of subsidized housing benefit from the housing itself, as well as the neighborhood in which it is located. Residents of neighborhoods in which such housing is located are also affected by real and perceived externalities that may be hard to measure yet quite important in influencing the level of opposition to such housing. These concerns apply equally well to affordable housing.
I now provide a description of housing developments that include affordable and subsidized housing as special cases (see figure 1 ). This taxonomy is inspired by expositions on housing services (Arnott, 1987) , subsidies (Rosen, 1985) , and development (Miles et al, 2000) .
Key components of housing and affordable housing initiatives central to the planning models used in this paper are defined as follows. A housing unit is a dwelling space containing one or more rooms intended to be continuously occupied by a single household. A housing unit is characterized by: tenure type (renter or owner-occupied), conversion status (if applicable, renter occupied to owner-occupied or back; alternatively, commercial to residential), attributes (physical characteristics, such as number of rooms, and marketing attributes, such as asking price), market value, and subsidy type (tenant-based or project-based subsidies, or none).
A structure is a building that is classified for zoning purposes as having one of the following uses : housing, commercial, ancillary, or mixed use. For the purposes of this paper, I define a housing structure as a building used exclusively for housing. A housing structure is characterized by: production method (construction, purchase, or rehabilitation), production environment (`greenfield' land not previously used for building development or`brownfield' land previously used for building development or infrastructure), production intensity (level of resources applied to develop housing structures, eg moderate or substantial rehabilitation; low, moderate, or high-quality new construction), attributes (a wide variety of physical characteristics, such as number of square feet), production cost, and subsidy.
A housing structure can be of two general residential types: single family, or multifamily. Both types of structures are further classified as detached or attached. Multifamily structures can be classified according to the presence or absence of common space, as well as scale (number of units).
A housing development represents one or more housing structures on one or more parcels, in a single production environment, according to a common production method. Housing developments are characterized by contiguity, income diversity, development time, and, if applicable, ownership type. The housing structures within a development may be of multiple residential types and may contain varying numbers of units with different tenure types and subsidy types. An example of a housing development might be a set of newly constructed, mixed-income, single-family and multifamily units built under the HOPE VI program on a dedicated brownfield site proximate to recently demolished public housing. Another example might be the current phase of newly constructed market-rate owner-occupied housing on a greenfield site (the ubiquitous suburban subdivision).
A housing project is defined as a set of units within a housing development built according to a particular combination of production intensity, housing unit tenure type, and residential type within a specific planning period. An example of a housing project is market-rate owner-occupied town-home-style units that are part of a new construction subdivision.
A housing development plan represents a set of distinct developments, and therefore projects, built over a given planning horizon. A housing development plan is managed and produced by a corporate entityöfor example, public housing authority, a community development corporation (CDC), or a private developer, alone or in partnership. The development entity may be for profit or nonprofit in nature. Figure 2 is a reproduction of a housing development plan produced by a housing development firm for a community development corporation in Pittsburgh, PA. This figure illustrates the complex and time-dependent process of housing and community development. Planning models for affordable housing For example, parcels can contain one or more housing structures, each of which is classified according to the project, development, and phase of the plan.
Affordable housing providers and prescriptive planning models
It is useful to identify in more detail potential users of planning models for affordable housing, and the planning contexts in which these models might be applied.
To the list of affordable housing providers developed initially we add community development partnerships (CDPs) (Glickman and Servon, 1998) . CDPs are regional and local intermediaries that help CDCs to acquire the technical and administrative expertise and financial resources to provide housing and economic development services more effectively. Another additional class of affordable housing providers is citywide, metropolitan, and regional nonprofit developers that often cooperate with local CDCs and other providers to leverage large amounts of development capital and technical expertise (Walker, 1993 ). Yet another is the collection of administrative and political intermediaries, such as municipal and county-level governments, which prepare comprehensive strategies by which affordable housing goals are set and through which federal funds pass to local affordable housing providers (Varady, 1996) .
Affordable housing providers, and the organizations that support and facilitate affordable housing provision, must address two fundamental planning questions: in which housing programs should resources be invested, and in what locations should specific place-based investments be made? This is a topic addressed by a number of recent US publications that provide detailed administrative guidance and analysis of outcomes regarding housing policy tools such as low-income housing tax credits (US Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2004a), the HOME Investment Partnership Program (US Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2004b) and the HOPE VI public housing redevelopment program (Popkin et al, 2004) . These guides are not designed to help formulate or solve specific decision problems, however.
We assert that affordable housing providers which address these questions are potential consumers of the research contained in this paper. Affordable housing initiatives directed by CDPs or regional developers may span larger regions, such as a jurisdiction (Varady, 1996) or an entire metropolitan area (Lang and Hornburg, 1997) , and may require greater technical and administrative capacity than conventional developments. If the set of alternatives is large and not necessarily known in advance, mathematical programming-based models may add significant value.
However, few affordable housing providers use OR-based methods for housing planning. In a previous paper (Johnson, 2000) I concluded that these organizations may be reluctant to frame large-scale planning problems in the context of prescriptive, quantitative planning. The results in this paper should thus be interpreted as only suggestive of the policy insights which affordable housing providers might derive from prescriptive models.
3 Affordable housing planning models I propose a process, that is based in part on current practice, by which an affordable housing provider might design appropriate initiatives. In the first step the provider identifies spending levels among various housing programs over a broad service area in order to optimize a measure associated with organizational goals. In the second step the provider uses spending levels defined for the different housing programs in the first step as a basis for developing recommendations for specific locations and configurations of housing developments within specific neighborhoods. Decomposing the problem in this way is useful because emphasis can be placed initially on strategic investment priorities rather than on specific projects whose criteria for inclusion may be unclear. Housing providers can then identify alternatives for a variety of specific housing programs. This approach is inspired by the extensive literature in multilevel planning, in which the goal, generally, is to design strategies by which a higher-level authority, concerned with policy for an entire region, can cooperate with one or more lower-level authorities, whose responsibility is to smaller administrative units, such as neighborhoods or municipalities. Multilevel planning models optimize strategies for all authorities jointly. In this paper the multilevel planning process is seen as sequential, corresponding to the author's observations of actual housing providers. In addition, the scope of the planning problem addressed here is housing provision only, typically performed by a single authority, as opposed to funding and provision, typically performed by separate agencies.
Strategic model
The strategic resource allocation model is intended to generate budget amounts for specific programs that will serve as structural parameters for a place-based investment model. This is a challenging task in practice. (1) The goal of the housing provider here is to create a housing development plan, consisting of types and amounts of housing to provide across its service area, which represents the best possible use of available funds within the current planning horizon. Best possible use' combines notions of economic efficiency and community benefit, which may conflict.
The planning effort focuses on three characteristics of housing projects defined earlier: provision methods, housing unit tenure types, and residential types. In this strategic model it is assumed only that these quantities are known in limited and aggregate form for the entire service area, and are constant for the current planning period. It is assumed that total net social benefits are a linear function of the number of units to be developed. Sources for the structural parameters used in this model are discussed in section 4. The model follows.
Indices and sets: i 1, 2, F F F , n production methods (eg construction, purchase, rehabilitation);
tenure types (eg renter occupied, owner-occupied); J fjg; k 1, 2, F F F , p residential types (eg single family, multifamily); K fkg.
Data:
S i j k estimated supply of affordable housing provision model i, tenure type j, and residential type k across the study area; D i j k estimated demand for affordable housing; E i j k excess of demand for affordable housing over supply
& b i j k net social benefit associated with each housing unit in any project; m i j k total subsidy associated with each housing unit in any project; B total subsidy available for various housing initiatives; l i j k minimum number of units to be developed over planning period.
(1) According to Varady (1996, page 271), this task required``taking into account social science evidence on the types of programs most appropriate for particular population subgroups, judgments on the importance of different policy goals (eg choice, the opportunity for ownership), the preferences of clients, the capacity of the system, and programs that are currently available.'' Decision variables z i j k number of units to provide using production method i, for tenure type j, of residential type k
l i j k 4 z i j k 4 E i j k and integer, Vi P I, Vj P J, Vk P K .
Model (1)^ (3) is a linear integer program. The objective function (1) maximizes net social benefits for all housing strategies. Determining values for social net benefits are addressed in section 4.
Constraint (2) limits the total subsidy to be used for all housing strategies to the amount B. For example, an organization may know in advance the total amount of subsidies to be available under funding sources such as the federal low-income housing tax credit program. Large housing providers typically use multiple funding sources, each of which may be applied to multiple provision methods, tenure types, and housing types. Thus, a single funding constraint (2) greatly simplifies actual restrictions on funding for housing initiatives.
Constraints (3) are integrality and variable bonding constraints. Values of I i j k strictly greater than zero account for a housing provider's desire to address strategic community benefit via development of certain types of housing that may not, on shortterm financial measures alone, represent a net benefit. For example, considerations of strategic community benefit' might impel the provider to plan both for multifamily rental rehabilitation and for single-family owner-occupied rehabilitation, even if the former can result in net financial benefits while the latter might result in net losses.
Values of E i j k require the organization to develop affordable housing strategies that fill estimated gaps in demand over supply. Instances of this model are likely to be quite small.
Tactical model
The housing provider is now faced with the choice of location and configuration of different housing projects across the provider's study area. The number of facility-level attributes and the range of values for each attribute that define this location-design problem can be quite large.
We assume that the task of designing an affordable housing strategy comprises the solving of separate instances of a tactical housing planning model for each tenure type. This is done because rental housing rends to differ substantially in design and financial characteristics from owner-occupied housing. In addition, we limit our attention to a small set of housing attributes: we assume that a housing development located in a particular neighborhood is distinguished only by residential typeöfor example, single-family versus multifamilyöand number of units. Moreover, all units of each residential type in a project are identical in size, conversion status, and subsidy type.
The perceived unfairness, or inequity, of a particular development strategy as perceived by stakeholder groups, such as local residents, can be expressed in a variety of ways. In the absence of empirical data in support of a particular equity objective, we use`minimax' measures that minimize the perceived negative impact of affordable housing on most-affected communities (Johnson, 2003; 2006a) . This`Rawlsian' objective is widely used in economics and OR models, and represents a`worst-case' value orientation towards social justice. As for the strategic planning model, details on the computation of structural parameters are addressed in section 4. The model follows.
Indices and sets i 1, 2, F F F , n candidate neighborhoods for housing developments:
project types (eg single family, multifamily); J f jg.
Data:
S i j supply of type-j affordable housing in neighborhood i; D i j demand for affordable housing; E i j excess of demand for affordable housing over supply; 
minimize max
subject to y i j 4 Mx i j , Vi P I, j P J ; ( 6 ) 2x i j 4 y i j , Vi P I, j P J ;
n i 1
x i j binary , Vi P I, j P J ;
l i j 4 y i j 4 E i j and integral , Vi P I, j P J .
( 1 0 ) Model (4)^(10) is a nonlinear multiobjective integer program. Objective (4), to be maximized, represents the net social benefit minus total construction costs. Objective (5) represents the inequity, or perceived unfairness, from the perspective of host communities, of a particular development strategy. This quantity is defined as the minimum, over all neighborhoods i and housing types j for which the affordable housing gap is positive, of the maximum share of all type-j units sited in any particular neighborhood i, relative to the fraction of the total affordable housing gap for type-j units associated with any particular neighborhood i.
Constraint (6) enforces the requirement that no units can be located in a neighborhood unless a project is built. Constraint (7) enforces the requirement that every project be nontrivially small. Constraint (8) constrains the number of type-j units produced across all neighborhoods to the value P j derived from the strategic planning model. Constraints (9) ensure that the decision variables governing locating projects are binary. Constraints (10) ensure integrality of the project design variables and ensure that the amount of housing meets local and organizational needs.
Model (4)^(10) has approximately 2nm decision variables and constraints. To ensure localized development strategies, neighborhoods may be defined as, for example, census tracts. Typical study areas öfor example, counties in urbanized areasöare likely to have of the order of 100 neighborhoods. In section 5 I develop a linear version of this model suitable for commercial solvers.
Model parameters 4.1 Supply and demand of affordable housing
The affordable housing planning models introduced in the previous section require estimates of supply and demand for affordable housing that exceed the capabilities of traditional descriptive models. For example, estimates of the demand for affordable housing require knowledge of the needs of low-income and moderate-income households for housing units in areas where they currently reside as well as in areas to which they might wish to moveöfor example, to be closer to their jobs. However, reviews of economic models for housing demand (Arnott, 1987; DiPasquale, 1999) and supply (Megbolugbe et al, 1991) indicate that empirical applications of relevant theories are inadequate for generating estimates of these quantities.
Varady (1996) identifies three methods by which housing practitioners typically estimate the supply and demand of affordable housing: housing market analysis, needs assessment, and measurement of preferences or aspirations of householders. These methods typically rely on simple computations using administrative datasets. However, counting`affordable' housing units alone neglects the role of availability of these units for families who must search for them. Counting low-income and moderate-income families alone neglects the possibility of a`spatial mismatch' of low-income and moderate-income families with respect to place of residence versus place of work.
In the absence of relevant models to estimate the supply and demand for affordable housing across a large service area, I use the simple approximations listed above. My measure of supply is based on data from the US census on vacant rental and for-sale owner-occupied units. It is assumed that the supply of affordable housing equals the number of vacant rental and for-sale owner-occupied units whose monthly cost does not exceed 30% of a typical low-income family's income. I approximate demand by counting respondents to the 1995 American Housing survey who strongly agree with characterizations of their neighborhood as undesirable. These counts are limited to low-income respondents, disaggregated on the basis of tenure type, and scaled according to census population figures.
Dollar-valued impacts of affordable housing
The social science literature has identified a wide range of measures of impacts of subsidized and affordable housing. American programs that are the subject of outcome evaluations include Moving to Opportunity (US Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2003), HOPE VI (Popkin et al, 2004) , and the Gautreaux program (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum, 2000) .
Typical outcomes for programs such as these are classified by Johnson et al (2001) according to the stakeholder group and impact type. Affordable housing outcomes are most accurately measured using results from randomized social experiments and expressed in dollar terms using cost^benefit analysis.
Affordable housing impacts on program participants include: Neighborhood effectsö that is,`peer' effects resulting from exposure to more affluent neighbors; family outcomes, such as changes in the level of racial isolation in neighborhoods, welfare receipt, and labor market participation; and housing consumption, measured by, for example, consumer surplus. Potential affordable housing impacts on program nonparticipants include: changes in property values, antisocial behavior, political opposition, increased levels of low-income families, and changes in government expenditures.
I focus on two approximations to social impacts on affordable housing provision: changes in consumer surplus and subsidy levels. Johnson and Hurter (1999) use consumer utility maximization to estimate the change in consumer surplus associated with participation in a housing mobility program.
Subsidy levels can be approximated using administrative data from affordable housing providers. For example, affordable owner-occupied housing in the USA is often sold at a level significantly below its`official' sales price, via first mortgages (the price paid by qualified buyers) and second mortgages (the difference between the official sales price and the first mortgage, often deferred or forgiven completely). Subsidy levels for renter-occupied housing can be computed as the difference between the`contract rent' (tenant-based subsidies) or imputed market rents (project-based subsidized housing) and the client's housing contribution.
Fixed provision costs for a housing project include acquisition costs, construction costs and development fees. In practice, most of the variation in housing development costs across regions is associated with land and property acquisition costs (RS Means QuickCost Estimator, http://www.rsmeans.com).
The remaining parameter is the total amount of subsidies available for all affordable housing initiatives. This quantity equals the sum of all available non-debt-based funding sources over the planning period, such as tax credits, grants and equity, and can be derived from affordable housing provider administrative data. The client for this case study,`Affordable Housing Opportunities' (AHO), is a community development partnership representing fourteen municipalities in southwestern Pennsylvania, USA. AHO provides community outreach, housing development, small business development, and workforce training. Regional job losses have resulted in outmigration of residents, decreases in community economic development, and increases in abandoned and blighted housing throughout AHO's service area.
To address these problems, AHO is engaged in significant levels of housing redevelopment: rehabilitation of existing single-family housing for sale (`rehab for resale') and of existing multifamily rental housing, and construction of new housing, both single-family owner-occupied and multifamily renter-occupied. Figure 3 (over) represents AHO's service area and the projects currently under development within that service area. Table 1 represents characteristics of the population and housing stock within AHOs service area and the larger Pittsburgh metropolitan area. The population in AHO's service area is poorer and more racially diverse than the population of the Pittsburgh metropolitan statistical area (MSA) overall. In addition, the housing stock in AHO's service area is older, less valuable, and more likely to be vacant or renter occupied than housing across the Pittsburgh MSA.
As of July 2003, AHO has directed about $11.5 million in affordable housing investments, resulting in thirty units of new-construction owner-occupied housing, ninety-five units of rehabilitated owner-occupied housing and ninety-seven units of new-construction multifamily rental housing. AHO wishes to make better-quality decisions regarding investments in affordable housing, and to contribute to regionwide policy discussions on affordable housing.
Data availability and model modifications
The strategic and tactical planning models are solved for two tenure types (rental and owner occupied), two residential types (multifamily housing and single-family housing) and two provision methods (new construction and rehabilitation).
It is assumed that all parcels within a housing development are contiguous, that income diversity is limited to low-income and moderate-income families and that housing production takes place over the short term: one to three years.
It is assumed that the development environment is brownfield throughout, and that units are developed at a high level of quality. All single-family structures are assumed to be detached; multifamily structures all have common space and no elevator, and are characterized by number of units only. Subsidies are a combination of low-income housing tax credits and state-level grants in the same proportion for each combination of residential type, tenure type, and provision method. Each housing unit's size is two bedrooms; all units have project-based subsidies only. No units are converted from other uses or sizes.
AHO wishes to make housing development decisions using areal units that are as small as possible; thus the census tract is used as the definition of a neighborhood. However, I derive necessary estimates of affordable housing supply and demand from the American Housing Survey (AHS) (US Census Bureau, 1995), which reports results according to`zones' which are aggregations of census tracts. Through the use of definitions provided in the previous section, it is found that affordable housing demand substantially exceeds supply for owner-occupied and renter-occupied units in nearly every zone within Allegheny County, as shown in table 2.
Fixed costs and subsidy levels for AHO-developed housing are estimated using historical sales data, augmented with reasonable assumptions. Fixed provision costs (also known as`total development cost', or TDC) for multifamily renter-occupied housing projects are recorded from detailed cost certification records encompassing land and property acquisition, construction, development fees, and other elements. Provision costs of rehabilitated owner-occupied housing are computed using a practitioner rule-of-thumb that the TDC is equal to the listed sales price of each unit plus the value of a`soft second mortgage'. TDC data for new construction owneroccupied housing are currently unavailable; for this paper, these values are set equal to 150% of the computed subsidy level. Subsidy levels for owner-occupied housing are derived from administrative data on funds from actual programs used to develop individual units or groups of units. Subsidy levels for multifamily rental housing are currently unavailable; based on discussions with practitioners, these values are estimated here to be equal to 80% of the TDC, based on the AHO records of the market-rate sales price for its rehab-for-resale and new-construction units.
Estimates of`variable' öthat is, monthlyöper-unit housing expenditures and subsidies are computed for a small sample of AHO-developed units for which sufficient administrative data are available. Monthly rents for multifamily rental housing are taken directly from AHO administrative data. Monthly housing costs for owneroccupied housing assume that all owners qualify for special mortgages that require financing only for the mortgage. The amount of the monthly mortgage is computed assuming an interest rate of 7.5% and a term of thirty years. Monthly subsidy levels are computed from per-unit subsidy levels, assuming that these amounts are financed using a 7.5% interest rate and a term of thirty years. All dollar-valued figures used for our analysis are deflated to 1995 values using the consumer price index, consistent with 1995 data for housing availability. Results are contained in table 3.
Note that newly constructed owner-occupied housing carries a significantly higher subsidy level, on a per-project and per-unit basis, than other types of housing developed by AHO. This is consistent with local practitioner experience: new housing construction on brownfield sites, as compared with rehabilitation of existing units, often entails costly demolition of existing structures and environmental remediation. Provision (TDC) costs for all units exceed per-unit sales costs for owner-occupied units in all cases. This too is consistent with practitioner experience that affordable housing development usually requires at least $100 000 per unit in TDC for moderately sized or higher units. Per-project TDC values vary widely; this is a consequence of AHO development strategies, in which new-constriction and multifamily rehabilitation units are built in groups for purposes of financing, while rehabilitation units are built singly, with subsidies and financing procured unit by unit.
These data validate AHO's judgment that construction of housing units is significantly less attractive financially than rehabilitation. However, market pressures for new construction, and the possibility that existing housing stock may be sufficiently deteriorated to necessitate demolition and new construction require such a housing strategy in some cases.
Due to limitations on data regarding current occupants of AHO-developed housing, we are not able to estimate consumer surplus measures of family benefit. However, housing subsidy levels are an upper bound to consumer benefit deriving directly from housing consumption (Johnson and Hurter, 1999, pages 270^271) . Thus, I use estimated per-unit, per-month subsidy levels as an upper bound to net social benefits. In addition, data limitations prevent us from computing tract-level dollar-valued impact measures of affordable housing directly. Instead, these values are generated using probability distributions based on AHO historical data.
On the basis of discussions with AHO, an aggregate funding level of $5 000 000, covering all affordable housing initiatives, is used in the strategic planning model. I set the minimum number of owner-occupied units equal to 10.
My analysis is limited to Allegheny County, in which about half of AHO's housing development takes place. It is assumed, contrary to current practice, that AHO will develop an affordable housing strategy for all of Allegheny County.
Estimates of housing gaps in table 2 do not distinguish between housing types jö for example, new construction and rehabilitation. Finally, I use uniform distributions, with minimum and maximum values derived from observed data, as the basis for the simulation of tract-level structural parameters represented in aggregate form in table 3.
Strategic model results
I implemented the strategic planning model (1)^(3) as a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet using the add-in Frontline Solver. Model solutions indicated provision levels for multifamily rental, owner new construction, and owner rehabilitation of 44, 13, and 3 units, respectively, with corresponding subsidy requirements of $3 591192, $1 297 218, and $111 078, respectively.
Tactical model results
A subscript k was added to tactical model (4)^(10) to denote AHS-defined`zones', and n k denotes the set of census tracts contained in AHS zone k. I converted the nonlinear minimax' equity objective (5) to a linear objective by defining a new equity objective function equal to the continuous decision variable D, to be minimized, which bounds the equity expression
for each zone kX I implemented model (4)^(10) using the AMPL 8.0 algebraic mathematical modeling language (ILOG-CPLEX Division, Incline Village, NV) and solved it using CPLEX 8.0 for AMPL (ILOG-CPLEX Division, Incline Village, NV). I used the noninferior set estimating method (Daskin, 1995) to generate nondominated solutions. After AMPL's presolve step, each subproblem resulted in 493 binary decision variables, 493 general integer decision variables, and one continuous decision variable, as well as 1004 linear constraints. Solution times ranged from less than a second, when the ratio of the weight on the net benefit objective (11) to the weight on the equity objective (12) was very large, to the time limit of four hours, when the ratio of objective function weights was very small.
Each multiobjective linear integer program corresponding to the tactical planning model for single-family owner-occupied housing and multifamily renter-occupied housing generated a collection of nondominated solutions. Approximations to Pareto frontiers for both problem instances are shown in figure 4.
There appear to be substantial tradeoffs between alternative nondominated solutions. For single-family owner-occupied housing, net benefit measures range from À$618 104 (most desirable) to À$2 385 430 (least desirable), and equity measures range from 1.762 (most desirable) to 10.828 (least desirable). For multifamily rental housing, net benefit measures range from À$419 135 (most desirable) to À$3 546 000 (least desirable), and equity measures range from 1.093 (most desirable) to 14.372 (least-desirable).
I identity potential compromise solutions corresponding to`kinks' in each tradeoff curve that might appeal to a decision maker attempting to balance the needs of multiple constituencies. For single-family owner-occupied housing, the net benefit and equity objective function values of a`compromise' nondominated solution are À$1 231 020 and 2.549, respectively. These represent a 65.3% decrease from the least-desirable net benefit value and a 76.5% decrease from the least-desirable equity value. For multifamily renter-occupied housing, the net benefit and equity objective function values of a compromise solution are À$865 966 and 2.570, representing a 75.6% decrease and an 82.2% decrease from the least-desirable net benefit value and equity values, respectively.
Figures 5 and 6, generated using the ArcView 3.2 geographic information system (Environmental Sciences Research Institute, Redlands, CA) show that there are clear spatial variations in nondominated solutions. Figure 5 displays maximal net benefit, maximal equity and the candidate compromise solution as described above. These solutions locate thirteen units (ten new construction, three rehab for resale) in a total of two, five, and three tracts, respectively, out of the 533 tracts in Allegheny County. Similarly, figure 6 displays the three solutions to the multifamily renter-occupied housing planning problem that represent maximal net benefit, maximal equity, and the candidate compromise solution. These solutions locate forty-four units in a total of one, eight, and two tracts, respectively. The latter two solutions locate an average of 5.5 and 22 units, respectively, in tracts that receive any housing at all. The large gap in these average development sizes is an indication of likely scale economies in affordable housing development costs.
For both solutions, the small number of tracts used is a consequence of constraint (13) in the tactical model requiring at least two units to be located in each development and the fact that the equity objective (12) essentially tries to spread housing units as evenly as possible across AHS zones, which are aggregations of census tracts, rather than across individual tracts.
Discussion
The planning models and analytical results in this paper are asserted to enable affordable housing providers to design flexible strategies that address variations in physical configurations and social impacts. However, there is evidence that many providers do not have the technical or analytical resources, or the organizational impetus, to adopt models such as these (Johnson, 2000) . Why would such models, and the nondominated solutions generated by them, be of use to practitioners? More generally, what is the relevance of operational planning models for affordable housing to policy design? Institutional and regulatory environments that may be receptive to this research include those in which: the relevant facility-location problem involves quasipublic goods and services; the goods and services provided may result in significant externalities; there are conflicting policy objectives, including political opposition; those in which social efficiency measures cannot be measured by traditional logistics-based metrics. The approaches in this paper may indeed be inappropriate or unnecessary for certain environments. One example is a supply-chain design in which success metrics are unidimensional and easily measured using administrative data (eg route design for home-delivered meals). Another is stylized operational models that represent most elements of policy or scientific interest (eg adaptations of covering models for reserve design).
However, this paper and previous papers (Johnson, 2003; 2006a) have shown that the institutional context for affordable housing policy design has the characteristics listed above. Other policy settings support similar modeling approaches: the location of corrections facilities, especially those in urban neighborhoods (Johnson, 2006b) , or the location of senior service facilities such as conjugate care facilities .
Nondominated solutions to the affordable housing location problem presented in this paper arise because the solution methods used presume no knowledge of decision maker preferences regarding model objectives. This traditional view of multiobjective linear programming (eg Cohon, 1978) is still common OR/management science practice. As a result, the decision maker has significant flexibility to choose among multiple solutions the one that optimizes an implicit social utility function. When viewed as a multistakeholder decision problem, the Pareto frontier provides inputs to a process by which different stakeholders negotiate to reach consensus on a single acceptable nondominated solution. This is consistent with controversial facility-location problems such as affordable housing.
To clarify the link between operational planning models and policy design, it is useful to recall the distinction between policy analysis, policy modeling, and policy design. Policy analysis can be viewed as the process of evaluating the social efficacy of existing or anticipated policy initiatives. Policy modeling is the process of representing greatly simplified versions of complex policy initiatives to identify likely impacts over the long run. Policy design is the process of administrative planning and resource allocation for specific social interventions. Operations approaches common to decision sciences are most commonly used for policy design. Here, the problem may be reasonably well defined, though difficult to model explicitly or solve directly. These approaches are also used in policy modeling, though analysts may be more familiar with microsimulation or economic analysis. They are less often used in policy analysis.
This paper is an application of traditional OR/management science solution methods to affordable housing policy design. However, the models developed here rely on evidence of policy efficacy arising from affordable housing policy analysis (eg Millennial Housing Commission, 2002) . They rely to a lesser extent on policy modeling results (eg Caulkins et al, 2005 ) that identify possible beneficial long-term outcomes of increased levels of affordable housing.
Conclusion
This paper represents an initial effort to develop a mathematical programming-based planning methodology for organizations providing affordable housing across large regions to balance efficiency, effectiveness, and equity considerations. This research is motivated by evidence of a shortage in affordable, good-quality housing for low-income families in the USA, and the opportunity to help affordable housing providers design innovative policies based on best knowledge of housing markets and housing policy.
I presented a conceptual framework for quantitative, prescriptive models of affordable housing policy provision inspired by related research in multilevel planning and real estate development and based on actual challenges faced by US affordable housing providers. Next, I developed a pair of complementary mathematical programming models for affordable housing provision. The first is a`strategic' model, based on the knapsack problem, that identifies investment levels in various housing programs that optimize net social benefit. The second is a`tactical' model, inspired by the facilitylocation-design problem, which identifies locations of specific housing developments and the number of units in each development that jointly optimize measures of net social benefit and equity.
I then identified methods for computing the values of key structural parameters of these two planning models: supply and demand of affordable housing, and benefits and costs of affordable housing. In the absence to date of robust social science results in these areas, I have developed preliminary estimates using public and administrative data.
Finally, I applied the conceptual framework and planning models to the case of a real-life affordable housing provider in Allegheny County, PA. I found that the results for a multiobjective integer programming model for provision of single-family and multifamily housing resulted in well-defined tradeoffs between efficiency and equity objectives, and spatial characteristics related to specific model formulation choices. In particular, we identified`compromise' solutions for each model instance that may appeal to decision makers attempting to balance the needs of diverse stakeholder groups.
The realism and generalizability of the decision modeling framework outlined in this paper can be improved greatly. Estimates of affordable housing benefits and costs, and supply and demand, should be based on sound, rigorous economic principles. The assumption that variable impacts in the strategic and tactical planning models are linear in the number of units sited is not consistent with observed scale economies in affordable housing development. The choice of functional form for the equity objective in the biobjective tactical planning model ought to reflect values of key stakeholders based on field research rather than analytical convenience. Customized model solution algorithms might greatly reduce running times. Formal validation of model results will provide evidence as to the potential efficacy of the planning models in practice.
